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Nathan Moore
Nathan Moore

Checkers 7 V2 5 Cracked ##HOT##

You might recognize that game as Chinese checkers, though perhaps you noticed that it's not Chinese checkers. The name change didn't happen until an American toy company charged with bringing the game to the States retitled it "to reflect the growing worldwide interest in the Far East" during the 1920s. It wasn't important whether or not the thing really came from the Far East -- simply slap some dragons and a Chinese restaurant font on there, and you're good to go.

Checkers 7 V2 5 Cracked

And better is pretty easy to find. Just play 15/10 5/4! By slotting the 4-point, you give Black minimal shots and look to extend your block. Black has only one hit and cover number (6-1) which happens to be the only number that hits two checkers. Nice duplication.

Rising star James Sweeting took command from his pole-position start before Dunn moved to the point for good on lap seven in his Finger Lakes-powered no. 3RS Transport Sales & Service-Number One Speedway/Bicknell mount. Rudolph began ninth and had cracked the front-five by lap 10 while 12th-starting Sheppard had improved just one spot the first third of the race.

By itself, a McDonald's cheeseburger is normally delicious after a night out, especially with a side of French fries. But when you're eating other cheeseburgers in comparison, the Golden Arches just aren't all they're cracked up to be. The cheeseburger falls flat in pretty much all categories, but the loyalty thrives with convenience and price.

Cracking typically occurs when the fondant has been rolled too thin. When you try to work with it on the cake the thin part will start to pull apart and tear. If the crack is small like in the photo the easiest thing to do is either cover that part of the cake with a fondant decoration or turn the cracked side to the back! If the crack is large, you can mix a small amount (pea sized) of the same color fondant with a few drops of clear extract until you have a thinned mixture. You can then apply the mixture to the crack like spackle! You will be able to see where it has been patched but it will keep your fondant from falling off the cake if the crack is sizable.

It took thirteen years of brute-force computer analysis to examine all 500 billion billion possible board positions, but today (Thursday, July 19, 2007) researchers at the University of Alberta in Canada formally announced that they had finally solved the centuries-old game of checkers. Specifically: they had a file which contained full information on every legal position that can arise during the game, and which move, if any, will lead to a win or a draw in that position.

The task of solving checkers was undertaken and completed by Prof. Jonathan Schaeffer, who has been at it for close to twenty years. He developed the program Chinook in 1989 (together with Rob Lake, Paul Lu, Martin Bryant, Norman Treloar and others). Chinook was the first computer program to win the world champion title in a competition against humans. After a number of further successes in competitive play Schaeffer decided to concentrate on the problem of solving the game comprehensively.

One would do well to note that solving checkers was not victory of pure machine intelligence, but one based largely on rote calculating ability. Nevertheless: "It's a milestone," said Murray Campbell, co-inventor of the chess program Deep Blue. "He's stretched the state of the art."

From a mathematical game theory point of view, checkers is a simpler game than chess. There are only 5x1020 positions (5 with 20 zeros after it) in checkers, whereas chess has at least 1040 positions. Thus, we have a better chance of completely solving checkers than chess. However, that does not mean that checkers is easier (or harder) to play than chess.

During their preparations the Chinook team came across one interesting result: "Experiments in Chinook show that there comes a point where increased search depth provides diminishing returns." In particular, Chinook played better checkers with a 19 ply rather than a 21 or 23 ply search.

So, what does all this mean for chess? Can we extrapolate these results from one checkers playing programs to chess playing programs? Certainly, Chinook and Fritz use similar search algorithms. They each have a positional evaluation function. They each take advantage of table bases for evaluating endgames. The big difference is the number of positions possible in each game: 1020 for checkers and 1040 for chess. To get some idea of this, if a computer could solve checkers completely in one nanosecond (a single cycle of a 1 GHz computer), it would take this computer 3000 years to solve chess.

The Daily Beast called the story "false" and declared fact-checkers had "laid it to rest." It also called it a "lie" that "rocketed around conservative media." Yet in the Daily Beast's own story, it linked to non-governmental organization Harm Reduction International's list of typical items in smoking kits, which included "glass stems."

Jumping out to the young season standings lead in the POWRi Pure Stock Division has witnessed James Redus quickly gain a handful of wins on the season with Grayson McKiney, currently riding runner-up position in the points chase, gain another feature win on the year this time at Dallas County Speedway. Tyrel Jones would crack into the win column by earning the feature at Springfield Raceway as well as Tyler Knudtson making the feature victory at Midway Speedway as Electric City Speedway would find Leroy Morrison grabbing the event checkers with Cody Ohrenberg winning at Valley Speedway.

Some server types don't work when a server has online mode enabled. For example, BungeeCord does not work when online mode is enabled. Players using cracked clients are also unable to join a server that has online mode enabled. If you want to use BungeeCord or want to allow your players to use cracked clients, you will need to disable online mode.

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A complete revision history is at the end of this file.Over the last several weeks, the CERT Coordination Center has been working ona set of incidents in which the intruders have launched widespread attacksagainst Internet sites. Hundreds of sites have been attacked, and many of theattacks have been successful, resulting in root compromises at the targetedsites. We continue to receive reports, and we believe that more attacks aregoing undetected.All the vulnerabilities exploited in these attacks are known, and are addressed by CERT advisories (see Section III).We urge everyone to obtain these advisories and take action to ensurethat systems are protected against these attacks. Also, please feelfree to redistribute this message.We will update this advisory as we receive additional information.Please check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site.Also see CERT Summaries for information on intruder activity: _summaries/I. DescriptionIntruders are doing the following:- using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities- exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access- exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access- installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers- launching IP spoofing attacksII. ImpactSuccessful exploitation of the vulnerabilities can result in unauthorizedroot access.III. SolutionThe CERT staff urges you to immediately take the steps described inthe advisories listed below. Note that it is importantto check advisories periodically as we add updated information as wereceive it.a. Using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilitiesCA-94.15.NFS.VulnerabilitiesCA-92.13.SunOS.NIS.vulnerabilityb. Exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access CA-95.17.rpc.ypupdated.vulc. Exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root accessCA-93.18.SunOS.Solbourne.loadmodule.modload.vulnerabilityA-95.12.sun.loadmodule.vuld. Installing Trojan horse programs and packet Launching IP spoofing attacksCA-95.01.IP.spoofingThe CERT advisories are available from _advisoriesIf you find a compromise, please complete the Incident Reporting Formthat we have provided at the end of this advisory, and return theform to This completed form will help us better assist you.Note: Because of our workload, we must ask you not to send log files ofactivity, but we would be happy to work with you as needed on how tointerpret data that you may collect. Also, the CERT staff can provideguidance and advice, if needed, on how to handle incidents and work withlaw enforcement.Appendix: Incident Reporting Form(also available from _reporting_form)version 3.0CERT* Coordination Center Incident Reporting FormThe CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) has developed the following form inan effort to gather incident information. We would appreciate yourcompleting the form below in as much detail as possible. The informationis optional, but from our experience we have found that having the answersto all the questions enables us to provide the best assistance. Completingthe form also helps avoid delays while we get back to you requesting theinformation we need in order to help you. Sites have told us, as well,that filling out the form has helped them work through the incident.Note that our policy is to keep any information specific to your siteconfidential unless we receive your permission to release that information.Please feel free to duplicate any section as required. Please return thisform to If you are unable to email this form, please sendit by FAX. The CERT/CC FAX number is+1 412 268 6989Thank you for your cooperation and help.1.0. General Information 1.1. Incident number (to be assigned by the CERT/CC): CERT# 1.2. Reporting site information 1.2.1. Name (e.g., CERT Coordination Center): 1.2.2. Domain Name (e.g., 1.2.3. Brief description of the organization: 1.2.4. Is your site an Internet Service Provider (Yes/No):2.0. Contact Information 2.1. Your contact information 2.1.1. Name: 2.1.2. Email address: 2.1.3. Telephone number: 2.1.4. FAX number: 2.1.5. Pager number: 2.1.6. Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use only): 2.1.7. Secure communication channel (e.g., PGP, PEM, DES, secure telephone/FAX) [NOTE -- we will call to obtain the secure communication channel information] (Yes/No): 2.2. Additional contact information (if available) 2.2.1. Name: 2.2.2. Email address: 2.2.3. Telephone number: 2.2.4. FAX number: 2.2.5. Pager number: 2.2.6. Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use only): 2.2.7. Secure communication channel (Yes/No): 2.3. Site security contact information (if applicable) 2.3.1. Name: 2.3.2. Email address: 2.3.3. Telephone number: 2.3.4. FAX number: 2.3.5. Pager number: 2.3.6. Home telephone number (for our internal use only): 2.3.7. Secure communication channel (Yes/No): 2.4. Contact information for other site(s) involved in this incident (if available) 2.4.1. Site name: 2.4.2. Contact person name: 2.4.3. Email address: 2.4.4. Telephone number: 2.4.5. FAX number: 2.4.6. Pager number: 2.4.7. Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use only): 2.4.8. Secure communication channel (Yes/No): 2.5. Contact information for any other incident response team(s) (IRTs) that has/have been notified (if available) 2.5.1. IRT name: 2.5.2. Constituency domain: 2.5.3. Contact person name: 2.5.4. Email address: 2.5.5. Telephone number: 2.5.6. FAX number: 2.5.7. Pager number: 2.5.8. Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use only): 2.5.9. Secure communication channel (Yes/No): 2.5.10. IRT reference number: 2.6. Contact information for any law enforcement agency(ies) that has/have been notified (if available) 2.6.1. Law enforcement agency name: 2.6.2. Contact person name: 2.6.3. Email address: 2.6.4. Telephone number: 2.6.5. FAX number: 2.6.6. Pager number: 2.6.7. Home telephone number (for CERT/CC internal use only): 2.6.8. Secure communication channel (Yes/No): 2.6.9. Law enforcement agency reference number:3.0. Contacting Sites Involved 3.1. We ask that reporting sites contact other sites involved in incident activity. Please let us know if you need assistance in obtaining contact information for the site(s) involved. When contacting the other sites, we would very much appreciate a cc to the "" alias. This helps us identify connections between incidents and understand the scope of intruder activity. We would also appreciate your including our incident number in the subject line of any correspondence relating to this incident if one has been assigned (see item 1.1.). If you are unable to contact the involved sites, please get in touch with us to discuss how we can assist you. 3.2. Disclosure information -- may we give the following types of information to 3.2.1. the sites involved in this incident your domain (Yes/No): your host(s) involved (Yes/No): your contact information (Yes/No): 3.2.2. incident response teams, for sites from their constituencies involved in this incident your domain (Yes/No): your host(s) involved (Yes/No): your contact information (Yes/No): 3.2.3. law enforcement agency(ies) if there is a legal investigation your domain (Yes/No): your host(s) involved (Yes/No): your contact information (Yes/No):4.0. Host Information 4.1. Host(s) involved at your site. Please provide information on all host(s) involved in this incident at the time of the incident (one entry per host please) 4.1.1. Hostname: 4.1.2. IP address(es): 4.1.3. Vendor hardware, OS, and version: 4.1.4. Security patches applied/installed as currently recommended by the vendor and the CERT/CC (Yes/No/Unknown): 4.1.5. Function(s) of the involved host Router (Yes/No): Terminal server (Yes/No): Other (e.g. mail hub, information server, DNS [external or internal], etc.): 4.1.6. Where on the network is the involved host (e.g. backbone, subnet): 4.1.7. Nature of the information at risk on the involved host (e.g., router configuration, proprietary, personnel, financial, etc.): 4.1.8. Timezone of the involved host (relative to GMT): 4.1.9. In the attack, was the host the source, the victim, or both: 4.1.10. Was this host compromised as a result of this attack (Yes/No): 4.2. Host(s) involved at other other sites (one entry per host please) 4.2.1. Hostname: 4.2.2. IP address(es): 4.2.3. Vendor hardware, OS, and version: 4.2.4. Has the site been notified (Yes/No): 4.2.5. In the attack, was the host the source, the victim, or both: 4.2.6. Was this host compromised as a result of this attack (Yes/No):5.0. Incident Categories 5.1. Please mark as many categories as are appropriate to this incident 5.1.1. Probe(s): 5.1.2. Scan(s): 5.1.3. Prank: 5.1.4. Scam: 5.1.5. Email Spoofing: 5.1.6. Email bombardment: was this denial-of-service attack successful (Yes/No): 5.1.7. Sendmail attack: did this attack result in a compromise (Yes/No): 5.1.8. Break-in Intruder gained root access (Yes/No): Intruder installed Trojan horse program(s) (Yes/No): Intruder installed packet sniffer (Yes/No): What was the full pathname(s) of the sniffer output file(s): How many sessions did the sniffer log? (use "grep -c 'DATA' " to obtain this information): NIS (yellow pages) attack (Yes/No): NFS attack (Yes/No): TFTP attack (Yes/No): FTP attack (Yes/No): Telnet attack (Yes/No): Rlogin or rsh attack (Yes/No): Cracked password (Yes/No): Easily-guessable password (Yes/No): 5.1.9. Anonymous FTP abuse (Yes/No): 5.1.10. IP spoofing (Yes/No): 5.1.11. Product vulnerability (Yes/No): Vulnerability exploited: 5.1.12. Configuration error (Yes/No): Type of configuration error: 5.1.13. Misuse of host(s) resources (Yes/No): 5.1.14. Worm (Yes/No): 5.1.15. Virus (Yes/No): 5.1.16. Other (please specify):6.0. Security Tools 6.1. At the time of the incident, were you any using the following security tools (Yes/No; How often) Network Monitoring tools 6.1.1. Argus: 6.1.2. netlog (part of the TAMU Security Package): Authentication/Password tools 6.1.3. Crack: 6.1.4. One-time passwords: 6.1.5. Proactive password checkers: 6.1.6. Shadow passwords: 6.1.7. Kerberos: Service filtering tools 6.1.8. Host access control via modified daemons or wrappers: 6.1.9. Drawbridge (part of the TAMU Security Package): 6.1.10. Firewall (what product): 6.1.11. TCP access control using packet filtering: Tools to scan hosts for known vulnerabilities 6.1.12. ISS: 6.1.13. SATAN: Multi-purpose tools 6.1.14. C2 security: 6.1.15. COPS: 6.1.16. Tiger (part of the TAMU Security Package): File Integrity Checking tools 6.1.17. MD5: 6.1.18. Tripwire: Other tools 6.1.19. lsof: 6.1.20. cpm: 6.1.21. smrsh: 6.1.22. append-only file systems: Additional tools (please specify): 6.2. At the time of the incident, which of the following logs were you using, if any (Yes/No) 6.2.1. syslog: 6.2.2. utmp: 6.2.3. wtmp: 6.2.4. TCP wrapper: 6.2.5. process accounting: 6.3. What do you believe to be the reliability and integrity of these logs (e.g., are the logs stored offline or on a different host):7.0. Detailed description of the incident 7.1. Please complete in as much detail as possible 7.1.1. Date and duration of incident: 7.1.2. How you discovered the incident: 7.1.3. Method used to gain access to the affected host(s): 7.1.4. Details of vulnerabilities exploited that are not addressed in previous sections: 7.1.5. Other aspects of the "attack": 7.1.6. Hidden files/directories: 7.1.7. The source of the attack (if known): 7.1.8. Steps taken to address the incident (e.g., binaries reinstalled, patches applied): 7.1.9. Planned steps to address the incident (if any): 7.1.10. Do you plan to start using any of the tools listed above in question 6.0 (please list tools expected to use): 7.1.11. Other: 7.2. Please append any log information or directory listings and timezone information (relative to GMT). 7.3. Please indicate if any of the following were left on your system by the intruder (Yes/No): 7.3.1. intruder tool output (such as packet sniffer output logs): 7.3.2. tools/scripts to exploit vulnerabilities: 7.3.3. source code programs (such as Trojan horse programs, sniffer programs): 7.3.4. binary code programs (such as Trojan horse programs, sniffer programs): 7.3.5. other files: If you answered yes to any of the last 5 questions, please call the CERT/CC hotline (+1 412 268 7090) for instructions on uploading files to us by FTP. Thanks. 7.4. What assistance would you like from the CERT/CC?Copyright 1995, 1996 Carnegie Mellon University.


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